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COMMENTS
EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1976
HISTORY
It would be difficult to exaggerate the role of credit in today's society.'
But for the availability of credit, it would be impossible for most Ameri-
cans to obtain an education, purchase a car, own a home, or start a busi-
ness.2 Because of the increasing popularity of credit cards, credit is relied
on daily in consumer transactions. Yet a number of persons have been
unable to obtain credit, not because of an inability to repay, but because
of their membership in a particular class.3
Women, especially, have been victims of credit discrimination.4 The
National Commission on Consumer Finance' explored obstacles faced by
women in obtaining credit in hearings conducted in May, 1972. The Com-
mission's final report indicated the following problem areas. Single women
have more trouble obtaining credit, especially mortgage credit, than single
men. Creditors generally require a woman upon marriage to reapply for
credit, usually in her husband's name. Such reapplication is not required
of men when they marry. Creditors often refuse to extend credit to a mar-
ried woman in her own name or to count the wife's income when a married
couple makes application for credit; and women who are divorced or wid-
owed have difficulty establishing credit! In addition, a report of the Senate
1. As of January 1, 1977, total household borrowing stood at $875 billion. FEDERAL RESERVE
BOARD, MONTHLY CHART BOOK 53 (Mar. 1977). Virtually all home purchases are made on
credit. About two-thirds of all automobile purchases are paid for on an installment basis. The
larger department stores report that at least one-half of their sales are on revolving or closed-
end credit plans. More than 15% of all consumer disposable income goes to meet credit
obligations other than home mortgages. S. REP. No. 589, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 589].
2. R. COLE, CONSUMER AND COMMERCIAL CREDIT MANAGEMENT 3 (1968).
3. 120 CONG. REC. 15,230 (1974) (remarks of Representative Sullivan).
4. Eugene Adams, then President of the American Banking Association, in a speech re-
printed in THE AM. BANKER, June 25, 1973, at 22, col. 3, admitted that "banks, along with
the rest of the credit industry, do in fact discriminate against women when it comes to
granting credit."
5. The National Commission on Consumer Finance was created by Title IV of the Con-
sumer Credit Protection Act of 1968 to investigate and report on the entire field of consumer
credit in the United States.
6. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CONSUMER FINANcE, CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE UNI STATES
152-53 (1972).
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Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs lists thirteen specific
practices that discriminate on the basis of sex and/or marital status.'
In response to this problem, Congress enacted the Equal Credit Oppor-
tunity Act' in October, 1974. The Act prohibits discrimination on the basis
of sex or marital status in any aspect of a credit transaction.' Congress
delegated authority to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
7. The following are examples of practices constituting discrimination which were cited by
the Senate report:
a. Holding women and men to different standards in determining creditworthiness,
e.g., minimum salary level (without regard to individual obligations), length of em-
ployment, length of residence, etc.
b. Requiring a newly married woman whose creditworthiness has otherwise re-
mained the same to reapply for credit as a new applicant.
c. Refusing to extend credit to a married woman in her own name, even though
she would be deemed creditworthy if unmarried.
d. Refusing to count a wife's income when a married couple applies for credit,
including jointly held credit cards or accounts, secured or unsecured loans, and mort-
gage loans. This practice includes but is not limited to arbitrary discounting of a wife's
income.
e. Refusing to extend credit to a newly separated or divorced woman solely because
of her change in marital status.
f. Arbitrary refusal to consider alimony and child support as a valid source of
income where such source is subject to verification.
g. Applying stricter standards in the case of married applicants where the wife
rather than the husband is the primary family supporter.
h. Requesting or using information about birth control practices in evaluating any
credit applicant.
i. Requesting or using information concerning the creditworthiness of a spouse
where an otherwise creditworthy married person applies for credit as an individual.
j. Refusing to issue separate accounts to married persons where each would be
creditworthy if unmarried.
k. Considering as "dependents" spouses who are employed and not actually depen-
dent upon the applicant.
1. Use of credit scoring systems that apply different values depending on sex or
marital status.
m. Altering an individual's credit rating on the basis of the credit rating of the
spouse.
S. REP. No. 278, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 16-17 (1973). For a general discussionof the problems
encountered by women in obtaining credit, see Gates, Credit Discrimination Against
Women: Causes and Solutions, 27 VAND. L. REv. 409 (1974) and The Discredited American
Woman: Sex Discrimination in Consumer Credit, 6 CAL. D. L. Rev. 61 (1973).
8. Act of October 28, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-495, tit. V § 503, 88 Stat. 1521 (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 1691 (Supp. V 1975)).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) (Supp. V 1975). "Credit transaction" is defined to include:
"information requirements; investigation procedures; standards of creditworthiness; terms of
credit; furnishing of credit information; revocation, alteration, or termination of credit; and
collection procedures," as well as any other aspect of an applicant's dealing with a creditor.
42 Fed. Reg. 1242, 1252-53 (1977) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(m)).
EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY ACT
System to prescribe regulations to implement the Act,"0 and in accordance,
the Board has promulgated Regulation B. 1
The Act went into effect on October 28, 1975. Only five months later
Congress amended it to include other categories of discriminatory prac-
tices. The Equal Credit Opportunity Act Amendments 2 expand the scope
of prohibited discrimination to include discrimination on the basis of race,
color, religion, national origin, age (provided the applicant has the capac-
ity to contract), receipt of public assistance benefits, and the good faith
exercise of any right under the Consumer Credit Protection Act. 3 This
legislation is a natural extension of the original Act. 4 Testimony given in
congressional hearings indicated that credit discrimination existed on
grounds other than sex and marital status. Pilot studies conducted by the
Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board
indicated a strong probability of race discrimination in mortgage lending.',
In its testimony the Department of Justice also noted emerging problems
of credit discrimination brought about by the Arab oil boycott and urged
the inclusion of race, color, religion and national origin to parallel other
civil rights legislation." The most frequently cited abuse in the hearing
record was discrimination against the elderly.'
10. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(b) (Supp. V 1975).
11. 12 C.F.R. § 202 (1976).
12. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691 (Supp. 1977). This section expanding the scope of prohibited dis-
crimination became effective March 23, 1977. Those sections of the Amendments dealing with
enforcement became effective as of the date of enactment, March 23, 1976.
13. Id. § 1691(a). The exercise of rights under the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. (1970), includes the exercise of rights granted under the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, and the various chapters on truth-in-lending.
14. See S. REP. No. 589, supra note 1, at 2. In May of 1974 Rep. Leonor K. Sullivan
introduced a bill, H. R. 14856, which would have prohibited discrimination in the granting
of credit on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, age, sex and marital status. The
Equal Credit Opportunity Act was enacted as a non-germane Senate rider on a House bill
dealing with bank deposit insurance and was limited to discrimination based on sex and
marital status. The legislative action came close to the end of the congressional year and in
order to get any legislation on credit discrimination passed in the 93d Congress it was neces-
sary to accept the limited Senate version. Equal Credit Opportunity Act Amendments of
1976, Hearings on H.R. 3386 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the House Comm.
on Banking, Currency and Housing, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 9, 14 (Apr. 22 and 23, 1975).
15. See Oversight Hearings on Equal Opportunity in Lending Enforcement Before the
Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (Mar. 11 and
12, 1976).
16. See S. REP. No. 589, supra note 1, at 3.
17. Id.
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EXPANDED PROTECTION FOR CREDIT APPLICANTS
The Equal Credit Opportunity Act prohibits discrimination in any type
of credit transaction. This protection extends to business"8 as well as con-
sumer credit. The amended Act provides that the Federal Reserve Board
may exempt any class of transactions "not primarily for personal, family
or household purposes" from one or more provisions of the Act.'9 In order
to make such an exemption, the Board must expressly find that the appli-
cation of such a provision would not contribute substantially to carrying
out the purposes of the Act. 0 In accordance with this power the Board has
exempted five categories of credit-business, incidental, 2' securities, pub-
lic utilities, and governmental-from certain procedural requirements of
Regulation B. Each of these types of credit is still subject to the general
rule prohibiting discrimination and to most of the substantive require-
ments of the Regulation."
Except for "affirmative action" credit programs, 3 the ban against dis-
crimination on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin and sex is
absolute. A creditor may not consider these characteristics at all in evalu-
ating an application. However, inquiries into an applicant's marital status,
18. President Ford, in signing the Equal Credit Opportunity Act Amendments into law on
Mar. 23, 1976, stated: "This bill carries out my recommendations. It applies to business credit
as well as consumer credit transactions and, thus, reaches discrimination against Americans
in the extension of credit which might arise from foreign boycott practices." 12 WEEKLY COMP.
OF PRES. Doc. 478 (Mar. 29, 1976).
19. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691b(a) (Supp. 1977).
20. Id.
21. "Incidental credit" is defined as credit that possesses three characteristics: the credit
is not made pursuant to a credit card account; no finance charge or other fee is or may be
imposed; and there is no agreement by which the credit may be made payable in more than
four installments. 42 Fed. Reg. 1242, 1254 (1977) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 202.3(a)(3)).
Incidental credit includes, for example, services provided by a dentist or lawyer before billing
the client.
22. See 42 Fed. Reg. 1242, 1253-54 (1977) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 202.3).
23. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691(c) (Supp. 1977) states that it is not a violation of the Act for a
creditor to refuse to extend credit offered pursuant to:
(1) any credit assistance program expressly authorized by law for an economically
disadvantaged class of persons;
(2) any credit assistance program administered by a non-profit organization for its
members or an economically disadvantaged class of persons; or
(3) any special purpose credit program offered by a profit-making organization to
meet special social needs which meets standards prescribed in regulations by the
Board;
if such refusal is required by or made pursuant to such program.
For the standards prescribed by the Federal Reserve Board for special purpose credit pro-
grams see 42 Fed. Reg. 1242, 1256-57 (1977) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 202.8).
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age, and public assistance benefits, if any, are permissible for limited
purposes. A creditor may request marital status in order to determine his
rights and remedies" where an application is for other than individual
unsecured credit.25 Inquiries concerning age and receipt of public assis-
tance may be made in order to evaluate credit history, the probable
amount and continuance of income, or other pertinent elements of credit-
worthiness.26 While Congress wanted to ensure that an applicant would
not automatically be rejected on the basis of age or receipt of public assis-
tance benefits, it recognized that these two factors do bear on creditwor-
thiness and should not be summarily excluded from the credit-granting
24. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691(b)(1) (Supp. 1977).
25. 42 Fed. Reg. 1242, 1254 (1977) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(d)(1)). For an
individual, unsecured account, a creditor may request the applicant's marital status if the
applicant resides in a community property state or if property upon which the applicant is
relying as a basis of repayment is located in a community property state. Id.
26. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691(b)(2) (Supp. 1977). The Federal Reserve Board has defined"pertinent element of creditworthiness" in a judgmental system of evaluating applicants as:
"any information about applicants that a creditor obtains and considers and that has a
demonstrable relationship to a determination of credit-worthiness." 42 Fed. Reg. 1242, 1253
(1977) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 202.2 (y)).
Age may be used as a variable in any "empirically derived credit system" which is
"demonstrably and statistically sound," so long as the age of an elderly applicant is not
assigned "a negative factor or value." 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691(b)(3) (Supp. 1977). For definitions
of "empirically derived credit system," "demonstrably and statistically sound," and
"negative factor or value" see 42 Fed. Reg. 1242, 1253 (1977) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. §
202.2).
The age of an elderly applicant may always be used in favor of extending him credit. 15
U.S.C.A. § 1691(b)(4) (Supp. 1977). In any case, where age is used as a variable in a credit-
scoring system, an elderly applicant may not receive fewer points for age than are assigned
to the class of applicants most favored on the basis of age. 42 Fed. Reg. 1242, 1253 (1977) (to
be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(v)). See id. at 1243 (explanatory material accompanying Reg.
B, Section 202.2(v)).
Many creditors, especially large creditors, use a credit scoring system to evaluate applica-
tions. Such a system generally consists of "an allocation of points to characteristics of the
applicant, the total number of points depending on how that applicant compares to a statisti-
cal sampling of previous applicants with similar credentials." S. REP. No. 589, supra note 1,
at 6. Creditor witnesses testifying at congressional hearings vigorously supported the credit
scoring concept and urged Congress to permit the use of age in such a system. See, e.g., Equal
Credit Opportunity Act Amendments of 1976, Hearings on H.R. 3386 Before Subcomm. on
Consumer Affairs of House Comm. on Banking, Currency and Housing, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
85-95 (Apr. 22 & 23, 1975) (testimony of Richard Cremer, Assistant Corporate Credit
Manager, Montgomery Ward). According to Mr. Cremer, Montgomery Ward gives higher
scores to older applicants because "our statistical analysis demonstrates there is close correla-
tion between the older age levels and good credit risks." He further stated that elimination
of the age factor from Ward's credit scoring system would substantially increase their bad
debt losses, "adding to the cost of providing consumer credit." Id. at 94.
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process. For example, an elderly applicant7 who is close to retirement
might not qualify for a loan if his future income will not justify the exten-
sion of credit.' Likewise a recipient of public assistance might not qualify
for a loan where his income is low or marginal. If, however, public assis-
tance income, either alone or in conjunction with other income, meets the
creditor's usual standards, credit may not be denied because of the source
of the income.29
The Federal Reserve Board has interpreted the Amendments to prohibit
discrimination against applicants because of the race, color, religion, na-
tional origin, sex, marital status or age of persons with whom the applicant
associates. 0 Thus, not only is it impermissible for a creditor to consider the
applicant's race, it is also impermissible for him to consider the race of
partners or officers of the applicant, that of individuals who may be asso-
ciated with the applicant in connection with the purpose of the extension
of credit (for example, the prospective tenants in an apartment complex
to be constructed with the loan proceeds), or the race of individuals resid-
ing in the neighborhood in which the collateral is located.'
Effects Test
In addition to proscribing intentional discrimination, the amended Act
may be interpreted as prohibiting actions that have the effect of discrimi-
nating against applicants of any protected class. The legislative history
indicates that Congress intends for cases interpreting equal employment
legislation, specifically Griggs v. Duke Power Company" and Albemarle
Paper Company v. Moody,33 to serve as guides in the application of the
Equal Credit Opportunity Act-especially with respect to the allocation of
27. The amended regulation defines "elderly" as 62 years of age or older. 42 Fed. Reg. 1242,
1253 (1977) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(o)).
28. S. REP. No. 589, supra note 1, at 5.
29. Id. For a further discussion of how age and receipt of public assistance benefits may
affect the credit decision see 42 Fed. Reg. 1242, 1255 (1977) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. §
202.6, n. 9).
30. 42 Fed. Reg. 1242, 1253 (1977) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 202.2, n. 3). This interpre-
tation is contained in a footnote to Regulation B, but the Regulation states that footnotes
are to have the same legal effect as the text of the Regulation. Id. at 1253 (to be codified in
12 C.F.R. § 202.2(dd)).
31. Id. at 1253 (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 202.2 n. 3). This interpretation closely parallels
the actual language used in the section of the Fair Housing Act which deals with housing
credit. See 42 U.S.C. § 3605 (Supp. V 1975). Congress has specified that a person discrimi-
nated against in the area of housing credit may elect to recover under either the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act or the Fair Housing Act. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691e(i) (Supp. 1977).
32. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
33. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
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burden of proof.34 In Griggs the Supreme Court enunciated what has come
to be known as the "effects test." In that case the Court was deciding
whether an employer's requirement of a high school diploma and a satis-
factory score on two aptitude tests violated Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 since it operated to disqualify black job applicants at a sub-
stantially higher rate than white applicants. The Court held that Title
VII "proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are
fair in form, but discriminatory in operation."-" Thus a violation may
occur even when there is no intent to discriminate.36 Once a requirement
for employment or promotion is shown to be discriminatory in effect,
the burden shifts to the employer to show that such requirement has a"manifest relationship" to the job in question." If the effects test is applied
to the credit industry, any procedure or standard used by a creditor which
results in the denial of credit to a class of persons protected under the Act
at a substantially higher rate than persons not of that class may be a
violation of the Act, unless the creditor can establish that such procedure
or standard has a manifest relationship to creditworthiness. If Albemarle,
another employment case, is applied to the credit area, the burden of proof
shifts to the applicant to show that the creditor could have as effectively
used a less discriminatory standard to evaluate creditworthiness. Where
such showing is made and is not rebutted by the creditor, a violation of
the Equal Credit Opportunity Act may be found to exist.38
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System applied the ef-
fects test in its promulgation of section 202.6(b)(4) of Regulation B.39 This
provision prohibits creditors from considering the existence of a telephone
listing in the applicant's own name as a factor in the credit judgment.
Because married couples customarily have their telephone listed in the
husband's name only, the Board found that the practice of "[a]ssigning
a value to the existence of a telephone listing in the applicant's own name
was. . . fair in form but discriminatory in operation.""' The Federal Re-
serve Board has refrained, however, from including in the Regulation de-
tailed guidelines on the effects test or a list of prohibited practices, since
34. S. REP. No. 589, supra note 1, at 4-5; H.R. REP. No. 210, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1976).
35. 401 U.S. at 431.
36. "Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of employment practices,
not simply the motivation." Id. at 432.
37. Id.
38. 422 U.S. at 425.
39. 42 Fed. Reg. 1242, 1255 (1977) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 202.6(b)(4)).
40. Geary, Equal Credit Opportunity-An Analysis of Regulation B, 31 Bus. LAW. 1641,
1652 (1976).
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the test is a judicial doctrine and as such is subject to re-interpretation or
modification by the courts.4'
When a violation of the Act is traced to the effect of a credit practice
rather than to an actual intent to discriminate, the courts must decide
whether punitive damages will be awarded. Here again, the employment
cases are instructive. The issue in those cases is whether back pay will be
awarded when discrimination is found to exist. Title VII authorizes an
award of back pay "[i]f the court finds that the respondent has intention-
ally engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment
practice. 4 2 By and large the courts have interpreted "intentional" as
meaning a practice undertaken by an employer deliberately rather than
accidentally 3 and have not considered the employer's motive. In doing so
they have emphasized the compensatory aspect of back pay rather than
the punitive aspect. In Albemarle the Supreme Court established a stan-
dard for denial of back pay based on its interpretation of congressional
purpose in enacting Title VII.44 The Court held that the denial of back pay
to a plaintiff who successfully proves the existence of discrimination is
proper only if such denial would not frustrate Title VII's dual objectives
of eliminating discrimination in employment and compensating victims
for economic losses suffered.45 Under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act,
only the goal of eliminating discrimination by forcing creditors to scruti-
nize carefully the fairness of their standards is served by the punitive
damages provision. Compensation for any economic loss suffered is author-
ized under a separate provision for actual damages. The Act specifies five
factors that should be considered by a court in determining the amount of
punitive damages to be awarded." One is the degree to which the creditor's
violation was intentional. This section implies that a finding of intent may
not be necessary in order to assess punitive damages. The issue of intent
with respect to punitive damages will no doubt be a source of litigation,
and its determination will affect the number of suits ultimately brought
under the Act.
41. 63 FED. RES. BULL. 101, 107 (Feb. 1977).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. V 1975).
43. See Note, A Back Pay Award Standard: Albemarle Paper Company v. Moody, 54
U.N.C. L. REV. 196, 200 (1976).
44. 422 U.S. at 421.
45. Id.
46. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691e(b) (Supp. 1977) provides:
In determining the amount of such punitive damages in any action, the court
shall consider, among other relevant factors, the amount of any actual damages
awarded, the frequency and persistence of failures of compliance by the creditor, the
resources of the creditor, the number of persons adversely affected, and the extent to
which the creditor's failure of compliance was intentional.
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Statement of Reasons
In one of the most important provisions, the Amendments establish for
the first time in federal legislation the right of a rejected credit applicant
to obtain a statement of reasons for the action taken against him." A
creditor may satisfy this requirement (1) by automatically providing state-
ments of reasons in writing to applicants against whom adverse action is
taken; or (2) by giving written notification of adverse action which dis-
closes the applicant's right to a statement of reasons and the identity of
the person or office from which such statement may be obtained." The
statement of reasons must identify specific grounds for the adverse deci-
sion."
The requirement that creditors give a statement of reasons for adverse
action is expected to serve a number of important functions. First, if a
creditor knows he must explain his reason for denying credit, he may be
less likely to discriminate. Second, the statement of reasons may serve to
reduce misunderstanding and allay suspicion on the part of applicants.
Third, the rejected applicant will be educated as to how his credit status
is deficient. Fourth, in those cases where the creditor's decision was based
on misinformation from a credit reporting bureau or on inadequate infor-
mation in the credit application, the applicant will have a chance to rectify
47. Id. § 1691(d)(2) (Supp. 1977). The "adverse action" which triggers the obligation of
providing a statement of reasons is defined as "a denial or revocation of credit, a change in
the terms of an existing credit arrangement, or a refusal to grant credit in substantially the
amount or on substantially the terms requested." Id. § 1691(d)(6). For a more detailed
explanation of "adverse action" see 42 Fed. Reg. 1242, 1252 (1977) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R.
§ 202.2(c)).
48. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691(d)(2)(A) and (B) (Supp. 1977); 42 Fed. Reg. 1242, 1257 (1977) (to
be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 202.9(a)(2)). There was much debate on the issue of whether to
require a written statement of reasons in every case of adverse action. Testimony from credi-
tors indicated that significant costs would be involved in complying with such a blanket
requirement, but this testimony was questioned by consumer representatives as being an
overstatement of the costs. S. REP. No. 589, supra note 1, at 8. In order to protect the small-
volume creditor from being driven out of business by the costs of complying with this require-
ment, Congress provided that a creditor dealing in 150 or less applications a year may satisfy
the obligation by giving a verbal statement or notification. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691(d)(5) (Supp.
1977).
49. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691(d)(3) (Supp. 1977). Section 202.9(b)(2) of Regulation B states:
Statements that the adverse action was based on the creditor's internal standards or
policies or that the applicant failed to achieve the qualifying score on the creditor's
credit scoring system are insufficient.
42 Fed. Reg. 1242, 1257 (1977) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 202). The Federal Reserve Board
has provided a sample form for notification of adverse action with accompanying statement
of reasons. Id.
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such misinformation. And finally, the statement of reasons should aid in
the enforcement of the Act by applicants and enforcement agencies."s
Enforcement Provisions
In addition to enlarging the substantive rights of credit applicants, the
1976 Amendments substantially strengthen the enforcement mechanism of
the Act. Responsibility for enforcing the Act is divided among twelve fed-
eral agencies. 5 This administrative enforcement of the Act is augmented
by a provision for private enforcement, both on an individual and a class
action basis.5" In order to educate the members of the public as to the
existence of the Act and their rights under it, Regulation B requires credi-
tors to provide each credit applicant with a statement explaining the Act's
prohibition against discrimination and identifying the appropriate en-
forcement agency."3 An aggrieved applicant may bring an action under the
Equal Credit Opportunity Act in federal district court without regard to
the amount in controversy or in any other court of competent jurisdiction.,
If he is successful in enforcing liability, the applicant will receive the costs
of the action and reasonable attorney's fees in addition to any damages
awarded.5 5
The amended Act authorizes the Attorney General to institute actions
upon referral from any of the agencies having enforcement responsibility
or on his own initiative when he finds a "pattern or practice" of viola-
tions.5 6 Further, both the Federal Reserve Board and the Attorney General
are required to make annual reports to Congress concerning the adminis-
50. See 122 CONG. REc. S3067, H1709, H1710 (daily ed. Mar. 9, 1976) (remarks of Sen.
Biden, Rep. Sullivan, and Rep. Abzug).
51. 15 U.S.C. § 1691c (Supp. V 1975). The enforcement agencies and the creditors for which
they are responsible are: Comptroller of the Currency, national banks; Federal Reserve Board,
state-chartered member banks; Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, non-member insured
banks; Federal Home Loan Bank Board, institutions subject to § 5(d) of the Home Owners'
Loan Act of 1933, § 407 of the National Housing Act, and § § 6(i) and 17 of the Federal Home
Loan Bank Act; Securities and Exchange Commission, brokers and dealers; National Credit
Union Administration, federal credit unions; Interstate Commerce Commission, common
carriers; Civil Aeronautics Board, air carriers; Secretary of Agriculture, activities subject to
the Packers and Stockyards Act; Farm Credit Administration, federal land banks, land bank
associations, federal intermediate credit banks and production credit associations; Small
Business Administration, small business investment companies; Federal Trade Commission,
all other creditors.
52. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691e(a) (Supp. 1977).
53. See 42 Fed. Reg. 1242, 1257 (1977) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 202.9(a)(2) and (b)(1)).
54. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691e(f) (Supp. 1977).
55. Id. § 1691e(d).
56. Id. § 1691e(h).
[Vol. 12:203
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tration of their functions under the Act and to make such recommenda-
tions as they deem necessary. The Board must also assess the extent to
which compliance is being achieved and summarize the actions taken by
each of the enforcement agencies. 5
The Amendments extend the statute of limitations for bringing an ac-
tion from one to two years. Moreover, any applicant who has been a victim
of discrimination which is the subject of a proceeding brought within the
statutory period by the Attorney General or an enforcement agency may
bring an action up to one year after commencement of the government
action." This provision allows sufficient time for individual applicants to
bring a private action when, through publicity surrounding the govern-
ment's action, they learn of a potential violation affecting them.
A creditor who fails to comply with any requirement under the Act is
liable to the aggrieved party for any actual damages sustained and for
punitive damages up to $10,000.1 Congress provided punitive damages as
an incentive for bringing suit since experience with truth-in-lending litiga-
tion has shown that actual damages sustained in credit transactions are
difficult to prove. 0 The Amendments raise the ceiling for a class action
recovery from the original formula of the lesser of $100,000 or 1% of the
creditor's net worth to the lesser of $500,000 or 1% of the creditor's net
worth.'
Under the original Act, an aggrieved credit applicant was forced to elect
between pursuing his federal remedies and any remedies that might be
available to him under state law. The amended Act requires an election
of remedies only with respect to the recovery of money damages. An ag-
grieved applicant may sue for damages under state or federal law, but not
both."2 At the same time he is free to pursue administrative, injunctive or
declaratory relief under federal or state law. The narrower provision substi-
tuted by the Amendments appears to be a much better approach. Clearly
57. Id. § 1691f.
58. Id. § 1691e(f).
59. Id. § 1691e(b).
60. Geary, supra note 40, at 1643.
61. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691e(b). The class action ceiling was probably the most controversial
issue before Congress. The Federal Reserve had originally proposed a ceiling formula of
$50,000 or 1 per cent of a creditor's net worth, whichever was greater. This formula was
rejected by the Senate in 1974 and by the House Committee in 1975. It was pointed out by
some congressmen that a $50,000 liability would destroy many small businesses while a 1 per
cent limit for a large firm might be no limitation at all. E.g., "For example 1 per cent of
Exxon's net worth is $137,176,900.00. Bank of America's 1 per cent is $18,000,000.00 .
S. REP. No. 589, supra note 1, (additional views of Sen. Garn) at 23.
62. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691d(e) (Supp. 1977).
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an aggrieved person should not be able to collect damages twice for the
same conduct. On the other hand, the use of such state procedures as
mediation of disputes 3 between consumers and creditors is encouraged by
not foreclosing the consumer's federal remedies.
REGULATION B
An amended version of Regulation B has been formulated by the Federal
Reserve Board to implement the Amendments as well as the original Act."
There is no doubt that Regulation B has had a pervasive effect on the
credit-granting process. 5 There has been a great deal of cost involved in
bringing credit procedures into compliance. Creditors have had to revise
their application forms to comply with technical requirements of the Regu-
lation. 7 They have had to educate their personnel as to what inquiries may
no longer be made and what information may no longer be considered in
evaluating an application. Regulation B also has affected recordkeeping 9
63. See Equal Credit Opportunity Act Amendments of 1976, Hearings on H.R. 3386 Before
the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the House Comm. on'Banking, Currency and Housing,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1975).
64. 42 Fed. Reg. 1251 et seq. (1977) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 202). The amended
version of Regulation B became effective on Mar. 23, 1977.
65. See Geary, supra note 40. For a criticism of Regulation B from the creditor's viewpoint
see Mortimer, A Creditor's Preliminary Look at Regulation B, 93 BANKING L.J. 417 (1976).
66. According to a Paperwork Survey compiled by the Consumer Bankers Association in
August, 1976, the average institution has had to spend $2,750 in attorney's fees to revise its
forms to comply with Regulation B. One of the institutions surveyed, Wells Fargo Bank, San
Francisco, Calif., had to destroy 1,300,000 forms at a cost of $45,000. The survey showed that
the cost of bringing procedures into compliance with Regulation B is $6.75 per application
accepted, $9.68 per application rejected. Telephone conversation with Drew Tidwell, Legisla-
tive Counsel, Consumer Bankers Association (October 19, 1976).
The amended Regulation provides that creditors may continue to use any application form
that complies with the requirements of the October 28, 1975, version of Regulation B until
its present stock of those forms is exhausted or until March 23, 1978, whichever occurs first.
42 Fed. Reg. 1242, 1255 (1977) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 202, n. 6).
67. See, e.g., 42 Fed. Reg. 1242, 1255 (1977) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. §§ 202.5(d)(1) and
(3)). All references to sex must now be eliminated; it must be conspicuously indicated that
any designation of a courtesy title (such as Mr., Mrs., Ms., or Miss) is optional; only the terms"married," "unmarried," or "separated" may be used to describe marital status.
68. See, e.g., Id. at 1255 (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. §§ 202.5(d)(4) and 202.6(b)(5)).
Inquiries into birth control practices and childbearing intentions and capability may no
longer be made; and income may no longer be discounted on the basis of sex or marital status.
A 1971 survey of the lending policies of savings and loan associations conducted by the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board revealed that only 22% of the banks would allow full credit
for a working wife's income if she was age 25, had 2 school-age children, and worked full-time
as a secretary; 25% reported that they would count none of her income; 63% said they would
count 50% or less of her income. Hearings Before the National Commission on Consumer
Finance at 3 (1972) (testimony of J. McElhone).
69. 42 Fed. Reg. 1242, 1261 (1977) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 202.12).
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and credit reporting ° procedures employed by creditors.
The Effect of State Property Laws in Virginia
One provision of Regulation B of particular concern to creditors is sec-
tion 202.7(d), which provides when the signature of an applicant's spouse
may be required. The importance of this section stems from the existence
of a number of state property laws which affect the availability of a mar-
ried person's property to satisfy his or her debts in the event of default.
Two examples of such laws which exist in Virginia are (1) the ownership
of property by husband and wife as tenants by the entirety7 1 and (2) a
wife's dower interest in property owned by her husband.72
Unless joint application is made, a creditor may not require the signa-
ture of an applicant's spouse, or of any other person, if the applicant meets
A cost/benefit study of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act estimates the initial start-up cost
for complying with the Act to be $165.8 million, with an annual recurring cost of $127.5
million. Telephone conversation with James F. Smith, formerly Senior Economist, Manage-
ment and Consumer Finance Section, Federal Reserve Board (April 27, 1977). For a more
detailed discussion see Smith, The Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1974: A Cost/Benefit
Analysis, 32 J. FN. 609 (May 1977).
According to Mr. Smith the additional costs of complying with the 1976 Amendments will
be generated primarily by § 202.9 of Regulation B dealing with notification and § 202.12
dealing with record retention. § 202.9 will add an estimated $9 million of compliance cost
simply in notifying rejected credit applicants of the adverse action taken. This figure is based
on the cost of a 13¢ stamp and a 2-1/2¢ form times 57.25 million rejected credit applicants
per year. If 10% of these rejected applicants should request a statement of reasons (assuming
the statement did not accompany the notification), this would increase the notification cost
by approximately $12 million. This figure is based on a $2 payroll cost, plus a 13¢ stamp and
a 2-1/2¢ form. § 202.12 which increases the mandatory period for retention of records from 15
months to 25 months will add approximately $7.6 million to the cost of complying with
Regulation B for storage of rejected applications. Address by James F. Smith, Equal Credit
Opportunity Act: Revisited, Columbia University Alumnae Consumer Credit Management
Conference at Arden House, Harriman, N.Y. (Jan. 26, 1977).
70. 42 Fed. Reg. 1242, 1260 (1977) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 202.10).
71. Tenancy by the entirety is a form of concurrent ownership of property which may only
exist between husband and wife. Like a joint tenancy, it may be created only where the four
unities of time, title, interest, and possession are present. In other words, the tenants must
have one and the same interest accruing from one and the same instrument, beginninng at
one and the same time, and held by one and the same undivided possession. When one tenant
by the entirety dies, his or her interest passes by operation of law to the survivor. 2 MINOR
ON REAL PROPERTY § § 839, 853, and 953 (2d ed. 1928). To ensure that an estate by the entirety
is created in Virginia it is essential that the deed or will mention survivorship. Allen v.
Parkey, 154 Va. 739, 149 S.E. 615 (1929), aft'd, 154 Va. 749, 154 S.E. 919 (1930); VA. CODE
ANN. § 55-21 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
72. A surviving wife is entitled to a dower interest which equals a fee simple estate in one-
third of all the real estate of which her husband was beneficially seised during coverture of
an estate of inheritance. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-19 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
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the creditor's standards of creditworthiness for the amount and terms of
credit requested." A creditor may, however, require the spouse's signature
on any instrument necessary, or reasonably believed to be necessary, 4
under state law to make available in the event of default either property
relied upon to establish creditworthiness for an unsecured debt or property
offered as security. 5 The question then becomes: what instruments are
necessary in Virginia to insure access by a creditor to property of a married
person which is held by the entirety or which is subject to a dower interest?
A wife's right to dower in the property of her husband is superior to debts
contracted by him during the marriage .7 Thus, land owned by the hus-
band cannot be sold at judicial sale to satisfy a judgment lien free of the
wife's dower interest." This dower interest, whether inchoate or consum-
mate, represents an encumbrance upon the property, making title to it
unmarketable.7 1 In order to insure access to such property, a creditor who
relies on the property in extending unsecured credit should require that the
wife join in the note. In the event of default, a judgment lien creditor could
then institute a creditor's suit to have the land sold at judicial sale and
have title conveyed by a special commissioner.7 1 If both the husband and
wife are made parties to the creditor's suit as joint debtors, the commis-
sioner is authorized to convey title in both of their names, thereby extin-
guishing the wife's dower interest. 0
73. 42 Fed. Reg. 1242, 1256 (1977) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 202.7(d)(1)).
74. The Federal Reserve Board has used the language "reasonably believed by the creditor
to be necessary" in recognition of the difficulty of determining what instruments are legally
required in some states to enable a creditor to reach property. Id. at 1247 (explanatory
material accompanying Regulation B).
75. Id. at 1256 (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 202.7 (d)(2) and (4)).
76. 1 MINOR ON REAL PROPERTY § 319 (2d ed. 1928).
77. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-27 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
78. Ficklin's Adm'r v. Rixey, 89 Va. 832, 17 S.E. 325 (1893).
79. The conveyance after a judicial sale is usually made by a master or special commis-
sioner appointed by the court for this purpose. Lmz's EQurrv PLEADING AND PRACTIcE § 292
(3d ed. 1952).
80. A court of equity in a suit wherein it is proper to decree or order the execution
of any deed or writing, may appoint a commissioner to execute the same; and the
execution thereof shall be as valid to pass, release, or extinguish the right, title and
interest of the party on whose behalf it is executed as if such party had been at the
time capable in law of executing the same, and had executed it.
VA. CODE ANN. § 8-670 (Repl. Vol. 1957).
A husband and wife may join in a deed conveying real estate and such deed will operate
as a release of the wife's dower rights therein. Id. § 55-41 (Repl. Vol. 1974). Where a commis-
sioner executes a deed on their behalf, therefore, the same result should be accomplished.
[Vol. 12:203
EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY ACT
The Federal Reserve Board has suggested the use of a waiver of dower
rights wherever such an instrument would satisfy the requirements of state
law.8' It appears, however, that a bare waiver is not an acceptable method
of releasing dower rights in Virginia. By statute 2 a married woman may
dispose of her contingent right of dower by her sole act only where her
husband has previously disposed of his interest in the real estate. The
Virginia Supreme Court construing this statute in Powell v. Tilson,s
quoted from Burks' Address on the Code of 191984 as follows:
The extent of the power of a married woman over her contingent right of
dower is somewhat doubtful under the law now in force.... The revision
seeks to remove all doubt on this subject, and makes it clear that the wife
cannot convey her contingent right of dower to any person whomsoever
(which, of course, includes the husband) while the husband owns the real
estate in question."
Although the case was not decided on this point, it certainly supports the
belief that a bare waiver is not sufficient to bar a married woman's dower
rights in Virginia.
Where a married applicant seeks secured credit, however, and offers as
security property in which his wife is entitled to dower, it is not necessary
for the creditor to require the wife to sign the note itself. His interests are
sufficiently protected by requiring the spouse to sign the mortgage or deed
of trust securing the property.8 Except in the case of a purchase money
transaction," if the husband alone were to execute a mortgage or deed of
In the event that the husband should die prior to a judicial sale, causing the wife's dower
interest to become consummate, such dower interest may be subjected to sale to satisfy a
valid lien against the wife. Id. § 64.1-42 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
81. See, e.g., 42 Fed. Reg. 1242, 1247 (1977) (explanatory material accompanying Regula-
tion B); Excerpt from FRB Letter of February 10, 1976, No. 47, 5 CONS. CRED. GUmDE (CCH)
42,047.
82. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-40 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
There is no counterpart to this statute for curtesy, the interest a surviving husband takes
in realty of which his wife was beneficially seised during coverture. See id. § 64.1-19 (Cum.
Supp. 1977). Since the legislature has not limited the methods by which a husband may
dispose of an inchoate curtesy right, presumably he may release this right in favor of his wife's
creditor by written waiver.
83. 161 Va. 318, 170 S.E. 750 (1933).
84. 5 VA. L. REG. (n.s.) 97 (1919).
85. 161 Va. at 328-29, 170 S.E. at 754 (quoting from 5 VA. L. REG. (n.s.) 97, 109).
86. Hoy v. Varner, 100 Va. 600, 42 S.E. 690 (1902); VA. CoDE ANN. § 64.1-28 (Repl. Vol.
1973).
87. See Gilliam v. Moore, 31 Va. (4 Leigh) 32 (1832). Where a vendor passes title to a
purchaser and as part of the same transaction receives back a mortgage or deed of trust to
secure the purchase price, the wife of the purchaser will take dower in the property subject
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trust, the wife's dower rights would remain paramount to the rights of the
mortgagee or trustee and anyone claiming under him.88
Where one spouse seeks unsecured credit relying on property held by the
entirety, the creditor must require the signatures of both spouses on the
debt instrument in order to make the property available in the event of
default. The leading Virginia case 9 holds that the entirety is liable for the
joint debts of both spouses, "[b]ut where a tenancy by the entirety in the
fee simple is once created the property is completely immune from the
claims of creditors against either husband or wife alone."9 This evidently
is true not only for real property but also for personal property,9' such as
stocks and bonds, held in the form of tenancy by the entirety.
This rule immunizing entirety property from the individual creditors of
either husband or wife follows from the general principle that a creditor
cannot subject to the payment of debts property which the debtor himself
cannot voluntarily convey. Once an estate by the entirety has been cre-
ated, neither spouse can sever it by his or her sole act or otherwise transfer
any interest therein.2
Where one spouse applies for credit and offers as security property held
by the entirety, the creditor's interest in the property is sufficiently pro-
tected by requiring the signature of the non-applicant spouse on the deed
of trust93 or security instrument" with a stipulation that recourse against
the non-applicant spouse is limited to the security conveyed. It is not
necessary to require that both husband and wife become personally liable
to the trust or mortgage even if she has not joined in the instrument, since her husband is
deemed to have only transitory seisin.
88. 1 MINOR ON REAL PRoPEaRY § 293 (2d ed. 1928).
89. Vasilion v. Vasilion, 192 Va. 735, 66 SE.2d 599 (1951).
90. Id. at 740, 66 S.E.2d at 602.
91. See Moore v. Glotzbach, 188 F. Supp. 267 (E.D. Va. 1960) and Oliver v. Givens, 204
Va. 123, 129 S.E.2d 661 (1963). The courts in both of these cases held that proceeds from
realty held by the entireties preserve their character as entirety property and therefore cannot
be reached by the individual creditors of one spouse. Although the case dealt only with a
derivative of realty, the court in Oliver stated "we . . . hold that in this State personal
property as well as realty may be held by a husband and wife as tenants by the entireties."
Id. at 126, 129 S.E.2d at 663.
For a discussion of tenancy by the entirety in personal property see Spies, Property, Annual
Survey of Virginia Law, 49 VA. L. REv. 1651 (1963).
92. Vasilion v. Vasilion, 192 Va. 735, 740, 66 S.E.2d 599, 602 (1951).
93. See Hurst v. Williams, 157 Va. 124, 160 S.E. 24 (1931), which supports the proposition
that a wife may put her own property up as security for the debts of her husband.
94. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.9-105(1)(d), -112 (Repl. Vol. 1965) for the proposition that
someone other than the debtor may own collateral securing a debt and that such person is
not liable for the debt or for any deficiency after resale.
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on the note in order for the creditor to reach the property on default. Unlike
the situation discussed above with respect to an unsecured debt, the credi-
tor who looks to security pledged by a husband and wife to satisfy a debt
upon default is not using judicial process to reach property that cannot
be voluntarily conveyed. A husband and wife certainly have a legal right
to convey their joint interest in the entirety. 5
The amended version of Regulation B clarifies when a creditor may
require the signature of a spouse. Under the original Regulation the"'necessary or reasonably believed to be necessary" standard for requiring
the spouse's signature was applied only in the case of secured credit.98 By
extending this standard to unsecured credit granted in reliance on property
and to unsecured credit in community property states as well as to secured
credit,9" the amended Regulation enables creditors to consider the effects
of state property law on their rights and remedies as permitted by the Act.98
Thus creditors are better able to protect themselves in the event of default.
While allowing creditors to obtain the signature of an applicant's spouse
may be criticized as eroding one of the goals of the Equal Credit Opportun-
ity Act, i.e., the availability of separate credit for married persons, such
procedure is compelled by state laws which treat the property of married
persons differently from that of unmarried persons. This is not to say that
a creditor may always require the signature of a spouse where the applicant
owns entirety property or property to which a dower interest may attach.
The Regulation permits the creditor to require the spouse's signature only
where reliance on such property is necessary to establish creditworthi-
ness.9 If the applicant's other assets justify granting the amount and
terms of the requested credit and such credit would be granted to an
unmarried applicant, then a creditor is not allowed to further insure his
credit risk by requiring the signature of the spouse on any instrument.
Furthermore, a creditor may not insist that a spouse sign any credit instru-
ment to establish an applicant's creditworthiness where the applicant is
willing and able to obtain the signature of a third party as co-signer or
guarantor on the obligation100
CONCLUSION
The Equal Credit Opportunity Act does not create a legal right to credit;
95. Vasijon v. Vasilion, 192 Va. 735, 740, 66 S.E.2d 599, 602 (1951).
96. See 12 C.F.R. § 202.7 (1976).
97. See 42 Fed. Reg.1242, 1256 (1977) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 202.7(d)).
98. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691(b)(1) (Supp. 1977).
99. 42 Fed. Reg. 1242, 1256 (1977) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 202.7(d)).
100. Id. (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 202.7(d)(5)).
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it does, however, create a legal right of equal access to credit. The amended
Act forces credit-granting institutions to apply the same standards to all
classes of persons. By striking out at credit discrimination, this legislation
protects the rights of individuals in an area that has been the subject of
much abuse. One possible danger, however, lies in over-regulation. Credi-
tors must be given the right to ascertain information which bears directly
on creditworthiness. They must also be able to insure access to assets in
the event of default. These are legitimate business purposes. If implement-
ing regulations are overly restrictive, the credit-granting process may be
so hobbled as to increase credit losses significantly. Such a result would
necessitate either increased cost to all credit consumers or higher credit
standards. This might exclude marginal credit risks, typically the disad-
vantaged, who previously could have obtained credit.10 If creditors cannot
obtain the information they need to evaluate applicants properly or if they
are unable to facilitate access to assets to protect themselves in the event
of default, they might turn away from the credit field and invest their
funds elsewhere. Thus, it is incumbent upon the Federal Reserve staff in
formulating regulations and issuing staff opinions and upon the courts in
interpreting the Act and Regulation B to consider carefully the problems
facing both creditors and credit applicants. It would indeed be unfortunate
if an Act whose purpose was to promote the availability of credit were to
result in making credit less available.
Judith B. Henry
101. Equal Credit Opportunity Act Amendments of 1976, Hearings on H.R. 3386 Before
the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the House Comm. on Banking, Currency and Housing,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1975).
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